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Fifth-generation fighter jets
A fifth-generation fighter is a jet fighter aircraft classification which includes major technologies developed during the first part of the 21st century. As of 2025, these are the most advanced fighters in operation. The characteristics of a fifth-generation fighter are not universally agreed upon, and not every fifth-generation type necessarily has them all; however, they typically include stealth, low-probability-of-intercept radar (LPIR), agile airframes with supercruise performance, advanced avionics features, and highly integrated computer systems capable of networking with other elements within the battlespace for situational awareness and C3 (command, control and communications) capabilities.
As of January 2023, the combat-ready fifth-generation fighters were the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, which entered service with the United States Air Force (USAF) in December 2005; the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, which entered service with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in July 2015; the Chengdu J-20, which entered service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in March 2017; and the Sukhoi Su-57, which entered service with the Russian Air Force (VVS) on Dec. 25, 2020. Other projects (even of sixth-generation fighters) are in various stages of development.
Are Russian fighters worse than Western ones?

Without bias, are Russian fighters (and their weapons) really that much worse than Western ones?
Adam Daymude, former US Navy EA-18G Growler pilot, explains on Quora;
‘Without bias, it sure does look that way. The Su-27 Flanker family is probably the best the Russians have right now (forget their Su-57 or MiG equivalent because they aren’t really operational).
‘A Flanker is a huge problem because it’s in the same class of fighters as an F-15C or Super Hornet. It has decent legs and can carry some really formidable weapons. But Russia doesn’t have true stealth and we’re finding out just how important that is in real time.
‘The Israelis have decimated the Iranian air defenses in just a couple of days while receiving barely a scratch in return using these bad boys:

‘After years of war, the Russians still haven’t established air superiority, much less air dominance (dominance means you have exclusive use of the airspace while superiority means you may still be shot at, but it’s too dangerous for your foe to take off because they’re seconds from being shot down at all times). The Soviets, yes Soviets and not Russians, built some amazing A-A missiles. The AA-10 Alamo semi-active series, the AA-11 Archer heat seekers, and the AA-12 AMRAAMsky fully active missiles [Even though the AA-12 was more capable than the AA-10, they could never field enough of them to drive our tactics. It was basically a non-factor] have always been viewed as a problem from our, NATO’s, side. We based nearly all of our tactics on how to beat these weapons.
Derelict
‘Where are they in Ukraine, though? Just like what the Israelis did with their attack to Iran, NATO would go in and remove all shooters (SAMs and fighters) so that the follow-on flights wouldn’t have to be bothered by outside threats and can instead hit whatever target we want with impunity. These missions are called SEAD/DEAD (Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses). Russia clearly can’t do that, though. I don’t know if it’s money, corruption, or a general lack of planning (probably a combo of all 3).’
Daymude concludes;
‘But again, with as minimal bias as I can muster, Russian aircraft appear to be derelict and have played a very minor role in this conflict. It also appears they prefer undertrained infantry vs highly trained pilots that can act autonomously. I don’t get it…at all. Sun Tzu commented on copying opponents’ strategies that work. Our way works and I don’t get why they aren’t copying us.’

Photo credit: Lieutenant Jonathan Pfaff / U.S. Navy and Israeli Air Force


