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Peacemaker
Conceived during 1941 in case Germany occupied Britain, when US bombers would then have insufficient range to retaliate, the B-36 was to be primarily a ‘10,000-mile bomber’ with heavy defensive armament, six engines and a performance that would prevent interception by fighters.
The Peacemaker provided the US nuclear deterrent until the faster B-52 became available in 1955.
As explained by Peter E. Davies in his book B-36 ‘Peacemaker’ Units of the Cold War, serious opposition to the B-36 came from the US Navy, which had feared the loss of its naval air forces to the USAAF after President Harry S Truman’s 1945 policy of uniting the US armed forces. The US Navy had ordered the AJ Savage, with twin piston engines and one jet unit, to carry the Mk VI atomic bomb.
P2V Neptune
As the Savage was not available until 1949, the P2V Neptune, with a wingspan of 100 ft, was seen as an interim nuclear bomber. It certainly fulfilled the range requirements. Prototype XP2V-1 Truculent Turtle flew 11,235.6 miles from Columbus, Ohio, to Perth, Western Australia, unrefuelled in September 1946. The flight lasted 55 hrs 17 min, creating a record that stood for almost 20 years.
Neptunes were then flown from the flightdeck of USS Coral Sea (CV-43) in April 1948. Shortly thereafter, 12 P2V-3Cs were ordered, these aircraft being specially modified to carry the 9000-lb Mk 8 nuclear bomb. Weighing up to 74,000 lbs, these bombers demonstrated the ability to deliver the weapon against targets up to 2200 miles distant from the carrier in several flights during 1949. Although this performance did not seriously rival the USAF’s heavy bombers, it showed that a purpose-built attacker like the AJ Savage did present a potential alternative strike capability from Midway-class carriers.
USAAF’s monopoly over the nuclear deterrent
The USAAF’s monopoly over the nuclear deterrent, with the B-36 as its centrepiece, also threatened US Navy plans established in 1945 for four supercarriers beginning with the 65,000-ton USS United States (CVA-58), primarily armed with 100,000-lb long-range nuclear-capable bombers. CVA-58’s keel was laid in April 1948, but the ship was cancelled five days later without consultation with the US Navy on the grounds that it duplicated the USAF’s nuclear role.

Defense Secretary Louis A Johnson, who had been a director of the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation from 1942, had also reduced other aspects of naval power to save money, whereas his predecessor (until March 1949) James V Forrestal had received Congressional funding for balanced US forces including USAF nuclear bombers and CVA-58 for the US Navy. Forrestal and Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan fought to stop the B-36 despite strong Congressional opposition. The strain on Forrestal eventually contributed to his mental breakdown and suicide.
A bitter inter-service struggle continued, inflamed by many published articles and unfounded claims by the US Navy that the B-36 contract was the result of financial incentives to several influential Congressmen by Consolidated Vultee. Adm Arthur Radford, one of the many opponents of the B-36 (he called it the ‘billion dollar blunder’ and a ‘1941 airplane’), was the US Navy’s spokesman at the October 1949 committee hearings at which the US Navy case was argued.
US Navy Vs B-36
Disputing the USAF’s claims regarding the bomber’s survivability, he asserted that Soviet forces would easily be able to intercept it within five years. He advocated smaller, faster tactical bombers such as the US Navy’s planned Model 593-8 (XA3D-1 Skywarrior), although they would have attacked targets that suited naval objectives rather than the urban strategic targets that SAC would have tackled. It was accepted that smaller aircraft than the B-36 would have to fly one-way nuclear delivery missions, although their higher speed might at least allow them to reach a target without being intercepted.
To challenge the B-36’s survivability, the US Navy proposed test interceptions on the aircraft by its new F2H-2 Banshee fighter. Simulated interceptions using another Banshee as a B-36 substitute at 45,000 ft had revealed that the fighter could bring its 20 mm guns to bear on a high-flying bomber, and also manoeuvre at that altitude. US Navy F9F Panther pilots reported that the bomber filled their gunsights at a range of one mile. McDonnell had intended to fit afterburners to the Banshee, enabling it to reach 40,000 ft within three minutes, but the afterburner installation was cancelled.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff bowed to USAF pressure and refused to allow actual interception tests in case the B-36 was shown to be too vulnerable in daylight attacks against targets with good ground-controlled radar systems. Many years later, Gen LeMay recollected that he had told the Secretary of Defense that the only way to solve the Banshee versus B-36 argument was for the fighter to fire live ammunition at a bomber flown by LeMay himself. His real point was that a simulated interception exercise would have been impractical since actual wartime combat was the only definitive way of evaluating a new weapon.
Shallow turns to evade fighters
However, in unofficial practice interceptions of B-36s by US Navy fighters at high altitudes, it was found that shallow turns were sufficient to enable the bomber, with far greater wing area than any fighter, to evade many fighters that struggled to manoeuvre in the thin air. The bomber had to maintain maximum speed. The B-36 was known for slow-acting flight controls and engine acceleration responses, and it could lose speed rapidly if the throttles were cut and the huge drag of the propellers took effect.

For the defence, as Rear Adm Don Engen later stated; ‘The Air Force made great pronouncements about the B-36. It was going to do away with the need for fighters. No fighter could fly in the wake of a B-36 without its wings coming off because of the turbulence of the props and jets. We were tasked to go up and show that the wings wouldn’t come off the airplane. So, we would use the ship’s CIC [radar control] on USS Valley Forge [CV-45] or USS Boxer [CV-21] to try to vector us [F9F Panthers of VF-51] to the B-36s. If that failed, we could always see a B-36 up there because the contrail was just humongous. If we didn’t have a ship out at sea to vector us, we kept two airplanes on the flightline to go up and intercept a B-36.
Gun-camera film
‘We had gun-camera film, and our chore was to intercept the B-36 and then fly in the wake with our gun cameras running, taking pictures all the time to show us battling with the wake and in the contrail. Then we would fly right by the B-36 and come down and land. That film would be flown non-stop to Washington and shown the next day by the admirals. They kept asking for more gun-camera film, so we just kept sending it over a period of weeks.
‘[The B-36 pilots] would usually look up at us and wave as we’d go by. We would fly right underneath the No 4 engine. I usually favoured going up the starboard side, and I would usually fly in the wake of the No 3 engine and then slide over under the No 4 engine. Usually, you had so much more speed than them that we’d just pull up and do a chandelle and look down at them. We’d wave, they would wave back and we would then go about our business.’
F3D Skyknights
A rumour that US Navy jets were actually trying to shoot down B-36s was current after several returned from flights with holes in their rudders that looked like 20 mm cannon hits. It was eventually found that globules of oil leaking from the inboard engines were congealing in icy high-altitude temperatures and penetrating the skin of the rudder. Because the oil then liquified at lower altitudes and ran down inside the rudder, the phenomenon was not discovered until cameras were fitted to a B-36.
By October 1949 US Navy F3D Skyknights had made successful night radar interceptions of B-36s at 40,000 ft. Naval fighters tended to have lower wing loading than contemporary USAF interceptors, giving them better high-altitude manoeuvrability. Air Defence Command’s F-89 Scorpions had particular difficulty in reaching the altitude of 99th SRW B-36s during practice interceptions over Michigan in December 1956.
Within a few years the rapid progress in Soviet fighter development would limit the B-36’s superiority in altitude over enemy territory.
B-36 ‘Peacemaker’ Units of the Cold War is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force



