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SAC B-29s deployed in response to the Berlin blockade
World War II proved what the proponents of air power had been championing for the previous two decades — the great value of strategic forces in bombing an enemy’s industrial complex and of tactical forces in controlling the skies above a battlefield. As a result, the Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command were created on March 21, 1946, establishing the offensive composition of the USAF that existed for more than 40 years.
As told by David Baker in the book US Air Power, 1945-1990 Volume 2 Bombers 1945-1949: Part 1: Policy, War Plans, Strategic Air Command and Manufacturers, 1948 was the first operational deployment of SAC aircraft in direct response to international tension and a potential military threat, when the B-29s were deployed in response to the Berlin blockade. In that year, SAC had 837 aircraft on strength, of which 486 were B-29s and 30 were RB-29 reconnaissance types, 35 were B-50s and 35 were B-36s.
Despite challenges gearing up with new aircraft and problems with support for the Berlin airlift, SAC ran a bombing competition in 1948 with the intention of measuring both proficiency and accuracy, establishing mechanisms for competitiveness, quality and teamwork across the various participating units. There had been persistent concerns at the lack of necessary standards, where 3,000ft (914m) CEP (Circular Error Probable), where 50 percent of bombs dropped from 25,000ft (7,620m) will fall within that defined radius from the target. During 1947 crews had shown wide variations in performance, showing anything from 2,600ft (792m) to 4,000ft (1,219m).
Bombing competitions
This first was held at Castle AFB between 20 and 27 June 1948 when 10 groups took part, each providing three aircraft for the contest. Targets were set at the Wendover, Utah, bombing range with drops confined to 25,000ft (7,620m) consisting of three visual and three radar sightings for each release to the target. The Eighth AF got the top five places, achieving an average CEP of 2,000ft (610m) followed by the Fifteenth AF and the 307th BG. The best individual crew award went to 1st Lieutenant M J Jones of the 509th BG despite that group achieving a CEP of only 4,000ft (1,219m). But competitions were no way to improve standards, merely highlighting the status quo.
Concerned at the lack of accuracy in some of the unit scores, General Curtis LeMay, the iconic leader of SAC, decided to extend the competitions to annual events, believing that the performance in the 1948 event had shown marked improvement, if only because of the challenge posed to each crew.
LeMay strongly supported mechanisms to improve team spirit and to encourage competitiveness as a means of stimulating performance and pride. The second bombing competition was held 3–7 October 1949 and included 12 bomb groups, three with the B-36, seven with the B-29 and two with the B-50. Spurred on by their lack of placing in the 1948 competition, the Fifteenth AF succeeded in getting top honours, despite the 93rd BG switching to B-29s when the new B-50s it had sprung fuel leaks. The individual crew trophy went to a 28th BG B-36 crew.
Spot-promotion programme
After the 1949 bombing competition, LeMay introduced the spot-promotion programme where 237 commanders and crew members displaying outstanding contributions were raised from the grade of 1st lieutenant to a temporary grade of captain. This would be expanded in 1950 and 1951 to include the promotion to ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, technical sergeant and master sergeant and would be the hallmark of service in SAC. LeMay created the closest doctrine of a meritocracy in military ranks possible in the Air Force and stimulated a greatly enthused desire to achieve and to be seen to exceed job requirements by gaining credit for outstanding performance. But it worked the other way; a slacking of that standard would result in the spot promotions being taken away, for the individual and for the entire crew.
The annual bombing competitions would be a test of integrated teamwork and the proficiency of individual squadrons as reflected through the training and experience obtained by each bomber crew.
A lot of the training involved rehearsals through radar bomb scoring, which had its genesis in the Second World War. Introduced initially by the British, night bombing by radar was forced upon the RAF by operations calling for crews to gain accuracy on designated targets in the dark and in poor weather. Over Europe that was most of the time and while the British had the designs for this equipment shared with the United States, it was American research and engineering that honed the equipment to an advanced level, utilised by both allies.
Radar Bomb Scoring activity
Radar Bomb Scoring (RBS) activity for SAC originated through the 206th Army Air Force Base Unit (AAFBU) activated at Colorado Springs on 6 June 1945 under the command of Colonel Robert W Burns. It had two SCR-584 radar detachments at Kansas City and Fort Worth, Texas, and additional detachments were set up at Denver, Colorado, Chicago, Illinois, Omaha, Nebraska, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Los Angeles, California. Th is unit was re-designated the 63rd AAFBU on 24 July 1945 under the Continental Air Forces but on 5 March 1946 it moved back to Colorado Springs and redesignated the 263rd AAFBU three days later.
Under SAC it was moved from assignment with the Fifteenth AF to the Headquarters SAC where it grew its capabilities. The number of RBS runs was relatively low at first, with only 880 in 1946, increasing to 2,499 in 1947 but under LeMay that activity was stepped up and considerable emphasis placed on giving crews a far higher exposure to simulated attacks and bomb runs. In 1948 there were 12,084 runs and this would increase to a peak of 28,049. On 21 July 1948, the unit was re-designated the 3903rd Radar Bomb Scoring Squadron and on 19 January 1951 it would be upgraded from a Squadron to a Group with 12 detachments and three bomb reporting squadrons.
SAC simulated mission with B-29s against Dayton
Bombing accuracy was key to a successful mission in real world situations and LeMay was concerned at the poor record demonstrated to date. In January 1949 a simulated radar bombing mission was conducted against Dayton, Ohio, in which only 71 out of 101 B-29s assigned actually left the ground. Only 303 bombing runs were completed at an altitude of 30,000ft (9,100m) rather than the usual 10,000–15,000ft (3,048–4,572m), two-thirds getting no closer to their targets than 10,090ft (3,075m). Aiming had been seriously compromised by the freezing conditions, heavy rain and thick cloud.
Frustrated, LeMay remarked that not one aircraft had completed its planned mission. Had this been the miss distance over Hiroshima or Nagasaki, the target cities would have been left unscathed. The blast wave and fireball of a Mk III implosion-type atom bomb was insufficient to achieve desired results should the detonation distance be greater than 2,000ft (610m) from the target. While much had been made by the public and the press in general about the destructive potential of fission bombs, in reality they were not as destructive as had been assumed and the ability of a SAC bomber to get within 1,000ft (305m) was a requirement, given the type of material against which the bomb would be detonated.
US Air Power, 1945-1990 Volume 2 Bombers 1945-1949: Part 1: Policy, War Plans, Strategic Air Command and Manufacturers is published by Helion & Company and is available to order here.
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force
