On the night of Mar. 13, 1958, one Mig-17PF flown by Wang Guo Shan of the 18th Division was the PLAAF’s last chance against a 34th Squadron (Black Bat) B-17 that had flown for six hours over the southern provinces.
After Mao’s communists took control of mainland China in 1949, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed an uneasy partnership with the nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan for covert air operations over the mainland – dropping agents and propaganda, and collecting signals, imagery and nuclear intelligence. But Communist China’s air defences reacted with determination and ingenuity to the unwelcome intruders.
In fact, as explained by Chris Pocock with Clarence Fu in the book The Black Bats CIA Spy Flights Over China from Taiwan 1951-1969, Chinese military technicians adapted Soviet hardware as well as tactics. During 1957, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 11th Aviation School and the 14th and 18th Air Divisions worked to improve the performance of the newly-arrived MiG-17PF fighters. The shortcomings of this aircraft’s RP-5 intercept radar were already apparent to Western intelligence as well the Chinese. First, the effective range was only two-and-a-half miles. Second, operating below about 3,000 feet it could not discriminate aircraft targets from ground clutter.
One solution explored by the Chinese to the second problem was to inhibit the radar’s -14 degree downward scan in elevation. The upward scan started from two degrees below the horizontal, and might still be adequate for interception, provided that the MiG pilot was well-vectored by Ground-controlled interception (GCI) to fly towards the target at the same altitude. But the PLAAF soon realised that, in order to intercept a relatively slow-flying target like the B-17, the MiG-17 had to be flown at an Angle-of-Attack (AoA) of 4-5 degrees to keep it from stalling. At this attitude, the -2 degree scan was useless, unless the target was above the interceptor. Since the intruders from Taiwan were flying at 1,000 feet they were usually below the interceptors. And it would be suicide for the MiG pilots to try and fly lower at night.
The Chinese pilots and technicians thought again. The downward scan of the radar was inhibited by only seven degrees. When the MiG flew at 4-5 degrees AoA the radar can was effectively 2-3 degrees below horizontal. This could provide a scan of the target without including lots of ground clutter.
The radar-equipped MiG-17PFs were thrown into the battle to intercept the intruders. On the night of Mar. 13, 1958, one Mig-17PF flown by Wang Guo Shan of the 18th Division was the PLAAF’s last chance against a 34th Squadron (Black Bat) B-17 that had flown for six hours over the southern provinces. No fewer than eleven MiG-15s had previously been scrambled further north when Wang took off from Shati airfield, in Guangdong. As the B-17 left the mainland and flew low out to sea Wang pursued it for 50 miles. Running short of fuel, he was directed by GCI to land at Shuixi airfield, on the Leizhou peninsula north of Hainan Island. But fog rolled over the airfield and Wang crashed and was killed as he tried to approach.
It was the second fatal loss of the night for the PLAAF. Earlier a MiG-15bis flown by Yang Yu Jiang took off from Changsha to act as a radio relay aircraft in the hunt for the B-17. Contact with the pilot was lost soon after takeoff, and the MiG crashed near Datuopu airfield at 2300.
The Black Bats CIA Spy Flights Over China from Taiwan 1951-1969 is published by Schiffer Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force
