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Why Iran can’t win the War against Israel
About Operation Rising Lion, Israel’s attack on Iran, I would like to observe that no, I do not assess Iran as something like ‘capable of winning this war’. Actually, Iran’s position is near-hopeless. Not only because of Israel’s (vast) technological superiority, subversion of the Iran’s chain-of-command. It’s foremost because of fundamental, strategic mistakes its Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) dictatorship committed over the last 20 years.
You see, the generals of the IRGC (most of whom were meanwhile killed by Israelis), were not only endemically corrupt (like Iran’s generals used to be already since the times of the Shah’s rule) but ‘missiles obsessed’. Arguably, back at the time they came to the idea to become obsessed with missiles, so in the early 2000s, that was ‘OK’. Even a ‘good idea’. Because the country couldn’t rebuild its air power: Russia wouldn’t deliver and China had nothing to deliver. Therefore, they embarked on developing a ‘shield’ in form of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and a ‘sword’ in form of (intermediate range) ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
However, in 2011, they then also launched their ‘Saving Private Bashar’-project in Syria, and then wasted (at least) some US$200 billion for that purpose over the following 13 years. This left Iran with no money necessary for a more rapid expansion of SAM- and IRBM-capabilities. At the same time, and despite financing its rebuilding in period 2008-2012, IRGC generals have left the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) so starved of funding that as of 2024, this was de-facto grounded. Sure, since the terminal collapse of the Su-35-deal with Russia, late last year, the IRGC has granted the IRIAF funding for additional overhauls for F-14s, but meanwhile it was too late…
Why Iran can’t win the War against Israel: IRGC strategic mistakes
Even in the first three-four days of the Israel’s attack on Iran, and although its top brass of generals has been shot away, the IRGC continued making strategic mistakes. Big announcements, followed by mass missile strikes – that were only exposing units of the IRGC Air & Space Force (IRGCASF) to Israeli air- and UAV-strikes. They would pull out their TELs with missiles, demonstratively drive them out and then fire them in groups. Eventually, these ‘demonstrative’ operations have reached such proportions that they strongly reminded me of the times back in late September and early October 1980, when the Tehran-regime-controlled Iranian media was publicly announcing every single of IRIAF’s air strikes on Iraq’s oil industry – in advance.

That, however, proved extremely costly: there are estimates that up to a third of some 300-350 of IRGCASF’s TELs for IRBMs have been knocked out, meanwhile.
Eventually, it took the new Chief of General Staff in Iran, Rear Admiral (ret.) Sayyari (a former SBS and veteran of the Iran-Iraq War), ‘days’ to ‘convince’ the IRGC to change its modus operandi. Since Jun. 16, instead of driving out lots of TELs at the same time, the IRGCASF does so with only two, three or four launchers, then rapidly fires several missiles, before disappearing – usually before the Israelis can reach and target the TELs.
Iranian Targeting
Obviously, this is resulting in a ‘lot less of spectacular action’ in Israel’s skies, every night. Occasionally, it’s resulting in missile strikes on Israel by day, too. But, in turn, it’s enabling Iran to extend the resulting battle of attrition.
Where Sayyari obviously still has a major problem while trying to command and control the IRGC is the issue of targeting. Actually, the available evidence is confirming only one thing: the IRGCASF is exclusively targeting:
- Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency and associated military units (Unit 8200, Unit 9900),
- air bases of the Israel Air-Space Force (IASF; foremost Tel Nov and Nevatim),
- Israel’s ‘dual-purpose’ facilities (see the refinery and power plant in Haifa), and
- surface-to-air missile (SAM) -sites defending the above-listed.
There’s no evidence for this, you think?
Oh, there is.
Israeli intel and military facilities hit by Tehran
For example, on Jun. 15, the IRGCASF almost hit an Arrow-III SAM-site: this Shahed-101 attack UAV was shot down by gunfire from an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter while already in the process of diving towards it.

During the night between Jun. 15 and 16, the IRGCASF hit an Iron Dome or David’s Sling SAM-site in Haifa…


…and then went on to demolish the local power station and the refinery. Because it takes so long to acquire necessary parts, alone the repair of the power station is likely to take 13-15 months.
Later in the evening, it hit Nevatim AB (possibly/probably while targeting the Dimona nuclear complex, too), causing a fire that wasn’t extinguished for hours…

Yesterday, the IRGCASF also hit the Glilot Military Intel Complex in northern Tel Aviv.


The last night, one Fattah-1 IRBM hit the Lod/Ben Gurion IAP area, another hit an Iron Dome SAM-site outside Netanya, one or two other missiles hit the Haifa area, while a third Fattach-1 evaded some 17-20 Israeli anti-ballistic missiles to hit ‘something’ in Tel Aviv.
In total, some 30 Iranian IRBMs were reported as launched the last night alone.
Check out the blog Sarcastosaurus and Helion & Company website for books featuring interesting stories written by The Aviation Geek Club contributor Tom Cooper.




