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The SR-71 that flew in the “denied area” where Soviets were test firing the SA-5
An icon of the Cold War, the SR-71 had been in frontline service for almost a decade by the time it started flying from RAF Mildenhall, Suffolk, UK, on a regular basis. The aircraft’s mission in-theater was simple — monitor Warsaw Pact troop movements along the Iron Curtain and photograph the various ports with access to the Baltic and Barents Seas that were home to the Soviet Union’s nuclear submarine fleet. During the course of these vital missions, the Soviets tried to intercept the SR-71 as it flew at Mach 3 just within international airspace.
On May 20, 1977, SR-71 64-17958 made history when it undertook the first operational mission by a Mildenhall-based `Habu.’ As told by Paul F Crickmore in his book Lockheed SR-71 Operations in Europe and the Middle East, its pilot for the flight was Maj Tom Alison, who recalled;
‘J T Vida – my RSO – and I arrived at Mildenhall via a KC-135Q, along with the TDY Detachment, Col Willie Lawson, and the Nav/Planner, Lt Col Red Winters. This particular mission was tasked at the Top Secret level using HHR imagery and ELINT sensors against the Soviet submarine base at Murmansk, on the Barents Sea. It was also scheduled as a coordinated mission with an RC-135V “Rivet Joint”.
Top Secret PARPRO
`It was a little unusual for a PARPRO [Peaceful Airborne Reconnaissance Program] mission to be classified Top Secret, but J T and I thought that this was because it was a coordinated sortie, and one of the first to go into the area around Murmansk. It may also have been due to the fact that the Soviets had deployed SA-5 SAMs around Murmansk, thus making this mission one of the first occasions that the SR-71 had been used in an area where there were known SA-5s. The latter was a much more capable SAM than the earlier SA-2, which was also widely deployed in the USSR, and was not considered to pose any great threat to the “Habu”.
`During the mission planning session on 19 May, it was discovered that the Soviets had issued a Notice To Airman (NOTAM) warning of SAM test firing to altitudes in excess of 100,000 ft. The coordinates for the NOTAM area were off the coast of Murmansk, and they nicely bracketed the only patch of sky that we would fly through twice during the mission—going in and coming out. We were always concerned about the Soviet military having intelligence pertaining to our missions prior to them actually being flown, and the issuing of this SAM NOTAM on the eve of our first operational sortie seemed like a highly improbable coincidence. Maybe, somehow, word about our mission had leaked out.
`Although at the time J T and I were not really aware of it, it seems that in some quarters this possible security leak caused quite a bit of concern. Apparently, there were several secure telephone conference calls made between RAF Mildenhall and the SAC SRC, and the discussion centred on whether or not to cancel the mission based on the NOTAM.
In international airspace at all times
‘It should be noted that the mission track was planned so that the SR-71 remained in international airspace at all times. If we stayed on the “black line” we would never enter Soviet airspace. However, that said the mission objective was to obtain maximum information concerning the submarine activities and area defences in this region. At one point during the second pass through the area the “Habu” was planned to be heading directly at the submarine base, perpendicular to the coastline, at Mach 3.15. We would then commence a high banking turn that would put us parallel to the coastline but headed out of the area. That point was right in the centre of the “missile-firing box” outlined by the NOTAM!
‘The concern at SAC HQ centred on whether the Soviets would actually fire an SA-5 against an aircraft in international airspace. “Intent” was always a key word in a situation like this. Another concern was that the SA-5 was new and relatively unknown in terms of radio frequency (RF) indications and performance. We were later told that Kelly Johnson (the design genius behind the Lockheed SR-71) actually participated in the telephone conference, and his position was that we should not fly the mission. In the end, however, it was determined that the sortie would he flown as scheduled.
‘The following day we all got airborne on time — the RC-135V, the KG-135Qs and the “Habu”. Our mission profile was normal through the refuellings, but as we began our climb and acceleration to Mach 3+ cruise prior to entering the target area, it became obvious that the outside temperature was much higher than we expected, and were used to. This caused the climb/acceleration to be slower than normal.
Degraded performance
‘It was so hot, and our performance so degraded, that at the point where we should have been level at Mach 3.15 and 75,000 ft, we were just passing 60,000 ft and still climbing at Mach 2.8. As J T and I were discussing our situation, he mentioned that the radar sensor had just come on. We had never had it come on while we were still climbing before. Additionally, the slower performance caused us to be well below the planned fuel curve. We had to decide whether to continue with the mission.
`In the event, we pressed on and finally levelled off at our desired cruise speed. We actually pushed the Mach up a little to try and help ourselves get back on the fuel curve — although I knew we would never be able to make up all of it, I was comfortable that we would be able to get back in the tankers for the next air refuelling if nothing else went wrong. And, in fact, that is just what happened. We completed both passes through the target area, and the missile firing warning area, with very little reaction noted on our defensive systems. The last air refuelling and the trip back to Mildenhall were uneventful, which was just the way we liked it.
SR-71 in the “denied area” where Soviets were test firing the SA-5
`During the debriefing following the flight we received word that we had aIready had a very successful mission, and our “radar take- had not even been processed yet. It seemed that the RC-135V “Rivet Joint” that was in the target area for some time before we arrived had had quite a bit of Soviet company in the form of interceptors. Just as we were beginning to enter the area, the RC- 135V crew became aware that the fighters had abruptly departed, and the linguists monitoring the radios overheard the Soviet ground control intercept controller trying to vector the interceptors onto the SR-71. At least one fighter pilot was heard to say, “I can see he contrail above and ahead. It is climbing, at a very high speed and I will not be able to catch it”. Heck, we already knew that!
Further adding to the initial success of the mission was the first ever capture of RF signals associated with the SA-5, which were picked up by both our systems and the SIGINT equipment in the RC-135V. J T and I had spent 45 minutes in the “denied area”, most of it at a little in excess of Mach 3 – just another day at the office.’
Lockheed SR-71 Operations in Europe and the Middle East is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo credit: U.S. Air Force, Lockheed Martin and George Chernilevsky via Wikipedia
