In this article:
Introduction
10 May 1972 is a memorable date in the annals of aerial combat. On that date, US Navy and Air Force aviators flying F-4 Phantom IIs shot down eleven North Vietnamese MiG fighters, and a Navy crew became the first American aces of the Vietnam War. Former TOPGUN instructor and F-14 RIO Dave “Bio” Baranek uses recent correspondence and interviews to shed light on the training that prepared Navy warriors for combat. Many of the lessons learned in the ’60s remain relevant and are applied in training programs today.
This article was originally written for “Classic Aircraft” magazine and published in the July 2012 issue to mark 40 years after the memorable events. Presented again with the author’s permission, and with minor updates, in honor of the passing of Commander Randy “Duke” Cunningham on 27 August 2025, because it portrays his spirit and commitment to air combat excellence. Part 1, presented here, gives some background for the air war in Vietnam and US Navy fighter training.
The Vietnam War
In May 1972, the United States was approaching eight years since the Tonkin Gulf Incident had blown the Vietnam War wide open. Over those years the number of American ground combat troops had risen and then fallen, and most types of aircraft in the inventory contributed to the effort through a series of campaigns aimed at bringing the Vietnam War to a conclusion.
The first major aerial campaign, Operation Rolling Thunder, is remembered for gradual escalation coupled with significant tactical restrictions on American airmen. The restrictions, sometimes referred to as the 14,000 mile screwdriver, did not optimize the use of U.S. airpower and the gradual escalation was not resolute enough to achieve the desired results. The operation’s effectiveness was diminished and the North Vietnamese were able to adjust their defenses and tactics to maintain their battle rhythm in spite of Rolling Thunder’s cacophony. The campaign ended in late 1968, when President Johnson halted bombing of North Vietnam as part of an agreement to begin peace talks.
Low Kill Ratio during the Vietnam War
During the first portion of the air war, 1965-68, US aircraft shot down roughly 110 enemy aircraft and lost 48, for an overall 2.3:1 kill ratio. [Note: As is the norm in air-to-air “box scores,” numbers vary by source. These came from an article in the May 1974 issue of Armed Forces Journal International.] When compared to previous wars, this kill ratio was shocking given that the U.S. was fielding sophisticated tools of modern warfare in the form of fighters and missiles and our opposition was a seemingly rag tag, hastily-constituted, force equipped with obsolescent fighters.
Of the 110 kills during the first four years, Navy aircraft accounted for 34. Most were scored by Navy fighters, F-8 Crusaders and F-4 Phantoms, but even the attack community painted a couple of MiGs on their aircraft: pilots of A-1H Skyraiders claimed two kills and an A-4C Skyhawk pilot claimed one. During this period the Crusaders received credit for eighteen kills and the Phantoms were awarded fourteen. The Navy’s 34 kills were offset by 14 losses, for a ratio of 2.4:1. The bombing halt serves as a convenient break point for analyzing air combat in Vietnam.
How did the U.S. get from the end of the Korean War to 1968 and why did we lose the skills developed in MiG Alley? The reason can be summed up by considering the political environment of the late ’50s and early ’60s. The U.S. military, fresh out of Korea and enjoying a relatively low opstempo, was not anticipating another engagement quite like Korea. The greatest threat was the monolithic Soviet long range strike capability.
The F-4 Phantom II
By the mid 1950s, McDonnell Aircraft Corporation had delivered more than 1,000 fighters to the US Navy, from the pioneering FH-1 Phantom and the sturdy F2H Banshee, to the ambitious but disappointing F3H Demon. The company proposed a greatly improved derivative of the Demon, which went through several iterations before it left the nest for its first flight in May 1958 as the F4H-1 Phantom II, the designation later changing to F-4. In the late 1950’s the primary threat was seen as long-range Soviet strike aircraft. Countering that threat is what the F-4 was built to do.
Characteristics of the F-4 included a long-range radar, all-missile armament comprised of Sparrow and Sidewinder, ground attack capability, and two powerful and stout J79 engines to propel the machine to Mach 2. The focus seemed to be on speed, altitude, and missiles ̶ engineering and technological superiority would surely bring success in combat. It was the Navy’s first jet fighter with no internal gun. To manage this sophistication the Phantom pilot was joined by a radar intercept officer (RIO), who operated the state-of-the-art weapons system. Navy F-4 aircrews had a full plate learning to operate the new machine: familiarization, formation, and day and night carrier qualifications used up many of the available sorties.
Training for combat
When it came to training for combat, the aircrew had to master air-to-ground as well as air-to-air missions and had to figure out how to work as a team within a single cockpit. Further crowding the syllabus, much of the air-to-air training in those early years emphasized using the weapons system to launch AIM-7 Sparrow missiles at approaching targets, then execute a reattack or stern conversion to the target’s the rear quarter. The head-on AIM-7 shot was important in defending an aircraft carrier from inbound bombers, an ever-present concern during the Cold War.
The F-4’s forward quarter launch capability was an advantage over threat fighters of the time, most of which used guns and rudimentary infrared-guided missiles. Achieving proper intercept geometry, employing the weapons system, and pilot-RIO coordination during intercepts occupied much of the time that might have been available for air combat training.
A skill that was shortchanged in this otherwise crowded training syllabus was close-in maneuvering. The thought being that the AIM-7 would destroy the target prior to a close-in engagement, right? Unfortunately, in the real world, tactical rules of engagement were such that the AIM-7 seldom left the rails prior to close-in maneuvering becoming necessary.
The Low Kill Ratio during the Vietnam War and the need for a new School for Navy Fighters
With a new, powerful, sophisticated fighter at their disposal, Navy leadership was not satisfied with their kill ratio over Vietnam, and they committed to finding solutions. There were actually several studies, the most famous of which has become known as the Ault Report, named for team leader Captain Frank Ault, a World War II veteran Navy pilot and aircraft carrier commanding officer. The report was a comprehensive study of the maintenance and operational performance of aircraft, radars, and missiles, as well as the training and tactics of Navy aircrews. The team worked from July to November 1968, so the Navy had a lead-turn on the air combat break that came with President Johnson’s bombing halt.
Recommendations from the Ault Report covered a wide range, including: conduct a quality control study of AIM-7 Sparrow manufacturing and develop new missile test equipment for use on aircraft carriers to ensure system readiness. With respect to aircrew training, some of the problems and solutions identified in the Ault Report can be summarized as follows:
- Aircrews did not recognize when they were “in the envelope” for launching missiles, especially at low altitude.
- The Navy needed an instrumented range to support accurate debrief of close-in maneuvering (“dogfight”) training.
- The Navy needed a dedicated fighter weapons school, with a core of instructors to consolidate, coordinate, and promulgate doctrine and tactics for fighter employment.
TOPGUN
These are among the fifteen recommendations related to aircrew training, from a total of more than 100 recommendations across 14 major subject areas. Some of them could be achieved by modifying the program of instruction at the training squadrons for Fleet aircraft, known as RAGs (replacement air groups). These were implemented quickly. As for the dedicated weapons school, the Navy had operated a similar organization before, called the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit. It had become a center of excellence for fighter tactics and weapons before it was disbanded in 1960.
In re-establishing a dedicated fighter weapons school, the Navy started modestly. The task was assigned to the F-4 RAG at Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, Fighter Squadron 121 (VF-121) Pacemakers. With a mandate to change the world, virtually no funding, and little official support, nine pilot and RIO instructors commandeered a trailer to use as a classroom and office and went to work. They possessed a tenacity befitting fighter aircrews and the ingenuity of MacGyver. Challenged with gathering intelligence on enemy aircraft and exploring the limits of the F-4, they studied engineering information and flew air combat maneuvering (ACM) against a variety of opponents. These intrepid instructors then prepared lesson plans, practiced their lectures, and opened the door for the first class in March 1969. In a grainy old photograph, you can read the crude sign above that trailer: TOPGUN.
The studies, programs, and systems would have been useless, however, without passionate warriors to take them into battle. Let’s hear from a few of the Navy F-4 aircrews who helped make 10 May 1972, a remarkable day.
NEXT: We meet some of the MiG killers from 10 May 1972.
