In this article:
TOPGUN Dedicated Instructors during the Vietnam War
In parts 1 and 2, we established the situation for the US Navy in the Vietnam air war, how the Navy fighter community responded, and examined some of the pilots who scored kills. Now former TOPGUN instructor and F-14 RIO Dave “Bio” Baranek wraps up with how the TOPGUN program became institutionalized.
The synergy of multiple developments contributed not only to events of 10 May 1972, but the remainder of the air war for the US Navy. Consider how Cunningham gained experience and confidence in the Phantom. He joined VF-96 just as the squadron returned from a tumultuous deployment in USS Enterprise and started the typical stand-down period. The commanding officer told Cunningham to “exercise the jets.” True to his nature, he used the opportunity to explore the envelope and fight anyone he could. Fortunately, Miramar was teeming with dedicated instructors.
Their names and accomplishments have been immortalized in Wilcox’s Scream of Eagles. Frost and Pettigrew have already been mentioned. Jim Ruliffson, J. C. Smith, Dan Pederson, Darrell Gary, Jim Laing, Mel Holmes, John Nash, and others burned up the sky, showing their opponents how it was done. They went up against the snorting Phantom in little TA-4J Skyhawks – the trainer version for Pete’s sake – and won! That got the students’ attention.
These new TOPGUN instructors had experience in the F-4 and had done their homework. They knew how to win a fight, but more importantly they knew why they won. And their mission was not to win in the W-291 airspace off Miramar, but to teach F-4 pilots and RIOs how to win over North Vietnam.
TOPGUN Increased the Navy’s kill ratio during the Vietnam War from 2.4:1 to 12.5:1
Essential to the Navy’s new ACM training philosophy was a thorough flight briefing, introducing new concepts as necessary, and explaining the relative disadvantages and advantages of participating aircraft. This set the stage for the head-spinning, g-intense dogfight that soon followed. Perhaps most important was a thorough, analytical, and objective debrief. The instructors insisted on accurate reconstruction and stressed the learning points, summarized as “Goods and Others”
Driscoll recalls debriefing with Ruliffson, and how “he would go into detail, but keep a positive attitude. People didn’t listen defensively.” This was a TOPGUN standard and went a long way toward effectively teaching aggressive and proud fighter aircrews.
One objection sometimes raised by those who opposed additional ACM training was that it was risky. Dosé neatly disposes of that critique, however, by pointing out that “we might lose some aircraft in W-291, but we’d rather lose them here than over Hanoi.”
The Navy got a good return on its investment in TOPGUN and the new ACM training culture. The bombing halt officially ended in April 1972, when strikes were authorized north of the 20th parallel. Operation Linebacker began in May. During the second part of the air war, 1970-73, the Navy’s kill ratio increased from 2.4:1 to 12.5:1, achieved against an enemy that had taken advantage of the bombing halt to significantly improve both its air force and surface to air defenses. (While some sources offer different numbers, it can be safely stated that Navy fighter crews significantly increased their lethality in 1972-73, validating the actions taken in response to the Ault Report.)
Preserving the Culture
Tactics and preparation are keys to success in air combat, possibly the most critical. Manfred von Richthofen is credited with saying, “It’s not the crate, but the man sitting in it.” TOPGUN embraces this idea and teaches that the aircrew can often be the deciding factor. To be their best, aircrews must have extensive knowledge of their own aircraft and weapons, as well as the enemy’s, and in current strike-fighter squadrons this is not the exception but the norm.
Another concept handed down through the decades has been the necessity for accurate and non-confrontational debriefs. Instructors do not focus on the score, but rather the reasons why key events happened. The Navy realized that one squadron could not bear the burden for this high level of training, and established dedicated adversary squadrons at appropriate bases around the country. Though their number has fluctuated over the years, the Navy remains committed to supporting these training resources.
Keeping the “spirit of attack, borne in a brave heart”
Perhaps the best way to close this article is to quote recently retired TOPGUN commanding officer, Will “Toast” Burney:
‘Bio’s article is a keen and apposite reminder in a time that is reproving the cyclical nature of history. Today, we’re in a situation reminiscent of the post-Korean War timeframe which Bio describes. The Navy’s love affair with missile technology in the late 50s/early 60s is akin to the current obsession with stealth technology – to wit, the F-35C Lightning II. (Guess what? No internal gun.) Fortunately, this time around we have managed to keep TOPGUN alive, thus avoiding the loss of resident tactical expertise and the hollow training that came as a result of closing the FAGU in 1960.
‘The current instructors at TOPGUN understand well the legacy they have inherited (in fact, each instructor receives a copy of the Ault Report when checking in to the staff) and recognize fully the vital importance of keeping the skills of the “man in the box” sharp and not overly reliant on technological crutches. Their dedication and relentless pursuit of excellence – especially in the face of increasingly downsized budgets, reduced flight hours, and squeezed resources – is keeping the “spirit of attack, borne in a brave heart” [ref Adolf Galland] alive and well in the Navy pointy-nose community.’
Acknowledgements and References
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. The author would like to thank the following for their generous assistance with this article: Randy “Duke” Cunningham, Willy “Irish” Driscoll, Curt “Dozo” Dosé, David “Frosty” Frost, Alex “Rattler” Rucker, James “Ruff” Ruliffson, Pete “Viper” Pettigrew, and Will “Toast” Burney. I am also indebted to former F-4 and F-14 pilot Jon “Hooter” Schreiber for his editing contributions. Any errors are, however, the author’s responsibility.
REFERENCES. The author used the following books to provide facts or background for this article, and endorses them for further reading: Lou Drendel, …And Kill MiGs (Squadron/Signal Publications, 1974); Lon O. Nordeen, Jr., Air Warfare in the Missile Age (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985); Tommy H. Thomason, U.S. Naval Air Superiority (Specialty Press, 2007); Robert K. Wilcox, Scream of Eagles (John Wiley & Sons, 1990).
Top image: unknown
