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Kyiv’s F-16s
As already reported Bloomberg reported on Jul. 31 ,2024 that Ukraine has received the first batch of fourth-generation US-made F-16 fighter jets.
According to The Kyiv Independent, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and Norway are expected to deliver at least 79 F-16s to Ukraine, with the deliveries to continue in the coming years.
The jets were all updated to the AM standard through the F-16 Mid-Life Update (MLU) package that was designed to upgrade the cockpit and avionics to the equivalent of that on the F-16C/D Block 50/52.
As already explained [CLICK HERE to read the article], the F-16 will not be a game-changer in the war. Nevertheless, it will provide the Ukrainian Air Force with tactical options they’ve never had since the war began: in fact, the F-16s will be able to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense capabilities and shield the country’s population centers from Russia’s daily bombings.
Here’s why Ukrainian Air Force should use its F-16AMs for ‘offensive counter-air’ operations
But how will Kyiv use the F-16s in the ongoing war against Russia?
I’ve expressed my doubts about using them to ‘bolster Ukrainian air defences’, and indeed: I do think they’re going to be useful for few other thingies, too. For example, for something called ‘offensive counter-air’ in military jargon.
Whether they have received additional modifications or not prior to their delivery to Ukraine, F-16AMs (these are single-seaters; there are also F-16BM two-seaters, but they are few, used for conversion training and thus ‘precious’: I do not expect to see them being deployed in combat very often), should arrive in Ukraine equipped with:
- AIM-120C Slammer active radar homing, medium-range-, and
- AIM-9X Sidewinder infra-red homing, short-range air-to-air missiles.
….in addition to their M61 six-barrel gun calibre 20mm, installed internally. Coupled with their upgraded AN/APG-66(V)2A pulse Doppler radars (max range around 80km), they should offer a better air-to-air platform than any MiG-29s or Su-27s currently in Ukrainian service.
Why ‘better’?
Because they are more reliable systems (read: have longer ‘between failure’ periods) and easier to operate, more ergonomic than what is currently installed in Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s.
How far can the Ukrainian Air Force integrate its F-16AMs with its existing IADS?
The biggest question mark at that point is: how far can the PSU (Ukrainian Air Force) integrate its F-16AMs with its existing IADS (integrated air defence system)?
About a year ago, there was a lot of talk about the PSU receiving the IBCS BN Gateway system from the USA: essentially, the same is a computer system with software capable of integrating not only current, Western-made radars and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but all sorts of old, Soviet-designed radars and SAMs. That’s great, but… pay attention at the diagram below, and then especially something called ‘Link 16’ there: this is the capability of the IADS to communicate/network itself with, for example, aircraft.
Why is this important? …why would that ‘Link-16’ be important?
Because the ‘Link-16’ is something like ‘US/NATO’s internet for combat purposes’. It’s networking all the intelligence and providing it straight to the ‘trigger pullers’, thus immensely increasing their situational awareness. For example: ‘at a click on a button’, an F-16-pilot on a jet equipped with the Link-16 would be as well-informed about all the known positions of Russian air defences and airborne interceptors, as his commander on the ground: he can see the same information on a display in his cockpit.
So, if the PSU really has the IBCS BN Gateway, and then gets the Link 16, its F-16s could receive the same ‘picture’ like the Ukrainian air defence network and that ‘in real time’.
In turn, this means that the Ukrainian F-16s could also operate without revealing their presence through radio transmissions or through powering up their own radars.
F-16s operating without revealing their presence
Why is this important?
Because the Russians have a very comprehensive system of electronic support measures (ESM) deployed in and around Ukraine – for example: such passive detection systems like Kolchuga, the same that are in service in Ukraine – and you can be 1000% sure that the first way in which the Russian military intelligence (GRU) is going to learn about the presence of F-16s in Ukraine will be either F-16-related radio transmissions or radar emissions. And the point is: no matter what’s the range of (for example) radios, or radars installed into Ukrainian F-16s, their emissions can always be detected from about two times further away.
The result is that even if an F-16 is, for example, airborne over Starokostyantyniv Air Base, its emissions are near-certain to get picked up by GRU’s ESM-stations still deployed in southern Belarus. And, every time these pick up ‘F-16-related’ transmissions/emissions, the Russians are going to know the F-16s are around, airborne, and thus a direct threat. They’ll be putting their air defence system on alert, scrambling their manned interceptors, probably scrambling even their brigades equipped with Iskander-Ms and -Ks for a possible deployment of missiles against possible Ukrainian F-16-bases, too.
Correspondingly: the best way for Ukrainian F-16s to operate (and that ‘right now, and for the next year or so’), will be to operate without emitting anything at all. That’s going to keep them safe – because it’s going to deny the Russians the option of obtaining superior situational awareness.
Ukrainian Air Force F-16AMs for ‘offensive counter-air’ operations
Operating that way sounds easy, but is anything else than that. It requires lots of preparation – not so much by the pilots or the unit operating F-16s, as by the entire Ukrainian air defence system (and then the air defence system of the PSU, plus the air defence system of the ZSU). People in command of the same must know there are going to be F-16s in a specific area, and their troops shouldn’t open fire at them. Just for example.
That alone takes awfully lots of organisation and coordination, because there are thousands of people involved, and the closer they are deployed to the frontline, the poorer are communications with them. …. which is why a few of PSU’s jets and helicopters have already been shot down by their own forces: so much so, most of those still operational have received large parts of their surfaces painted in Ukrainian national colours. As ‘methods of quick identification’…. like those applied on this Su-24:
Anyway… let’s assume, the PSU has got both, the IBCS BN Gateway and the Link-16…
In such case, the PSU could start deploying its F-16s for what I’ve mentioned above: for ‘offensive counter-air’ operations.
…Against UMPK-glide-bomb-releasing Su-34s?
Nope. The Russian Su-24s and Su-34s are usually releasing these from altitudes around 9,000-12,000 metres and 70km away. Thus, they’re going to remain outside the Ukrainian reach for a while longer.
However, the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) is constantly operating its Su-25 ground attack aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters for strikes on Ukrainian ground positions. These are flying dozens of combat sorties, every single day. Moreover, 10+ kilometres behind the frontline, the VKS is deploying its unreliably, and weather-sensitive Mi-28 attack helicopters to hunt down Ukrainian UAVs.
Russians air superiority over the battlefield
Thus, theoretically, there is plenty of opportunity for the PSU to deploy one (or more) of its F-16s to kill one of these.
Potentially at least, all of these would be within reach of Ukrainian F-16s.
…. of course: all provided one of incoming Russian formations is detected on time, and reliably tracked by the Ukrainian air defence system, of course – so that F-16s can be scrambled from their bases in time, too.
In such case, the PSU could scramble one (or more) of its F-16/s and vector it into an intercept attempt.
Even then, and essentially, the jet will still have to operate without emitting any kind of electronic emissions at all.
Why that?
Except for having a comprehensive ESM-system deployed in- and around Ukraine, the Russians are still in possession of aerial superiority over the battlefield, and if the F-16-pilots aren’t careful enough, they’ll get shot down already while trying to approach the combat zone in order to lob one of their AIM-120 at one or another Ka-52 or Su-25. Means: the Ukrainians will have to use ‘terrain masking’: fly extremely low, between hills, and man-made constructions while approaching the combat zone.
And that’s going to be ‘just for the start’: once within range, and thus inside the combat zone, an F-16 will have to ‘jink’ upwards, almost exactly like that MiG-29. However, contrary to that MiG-29 that, upon releasing its bombs, promptly entered a hard turn and returned back to the ground only seconds later – an F-16 on a counter-air mission will have to stay up there for a while longer: it will have to activate its radar, acquire the target and fire the missile, before returning back to the low altitude.
The game of hide-and-seek
Means: actually, that part of the mission is going to be even more dangerous than the release of JDAMS or HAMMERs by MiG-29s and/or Su-27s – because F-16s will have to continue flying in full sight of Russian radars, and in direction of these radars, for at least 15-20 seconds. And even once the F-16 will have fired its missile/s, it will still have to distance itself from the combat zone without getting intercepted by Russian long-range SAMs or manned interceptors (especially MiG-31BMs and Su-35S’ in return).
I.e. the game of hide-and-seek is going to continue. Just with few new weapons.
But, killing one or another Su-25, or Ka-52… or Mi-28… that would be a nice success – and give the Russians about a week or two of some very hard thinking (about what has got the aircraft in question and how to counter it). At least it would make them much more cautious before they would continue sending Su-25s and Ka-52s the harm’s way.
Ingredients
What would be necessary for the PSU to operate its F-16s that way, would be at least two… ‘ingredients’:
- ALQ-131 electronic countermeasure pods. Actually, these are already installed on Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian F-16AMs. The question is whether these countries and the Pentagon might grant permission for their delivery to Ukraine. Essence of ALQ-131’s function is jamming selected enemy radars and radar-guidance systems. Effects of its work could be roughly compared to those of ‘shields’ on spacecraft from TV-series like Star Trek: it could take the Russians by surprise, cause quite a lot of problems to their SAM-operators, and cause their missiles to miss. Thus: ALQ-131s would keep Ukrainian F-16s safe. Most of the time.
- At least as good – and, indeed, something for which one must ‘hope and pray’ (even if an atheist) – would be the delivery of so-called ‘towed decoys’. Thingies like AN/ALE-50, for example (photo below): they’re streamed behind the jet, and have proven exceptionally effective – both during testing and in actual combat. Sufficient to say, SAMs ‘love’ towed decoys, and that’s good that way, because they always go for towed decoy, instead for the aircraft towing the decoy. Means: towed decoys are also keeping aircraft safe from enemy missiles.
F-16s could do the same things Ukrainian MiG-29s, Su-25s, and Su-27s are already doing
Finally, Ukrainian F-16s could do the same things Ukrainian MiG-29s, Su-25s, and Su-27s are already doing: to be deployed for launching AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles and/or precision guided munition like GBU-39, GBU-63, or the French-made HAMMER.
In this regard, there would be not many differences between what an F-16 could do, and what Ukrainian MiG-29, Su-25, and Su-27s are already doing.
Me thinks, this is – currently – not that likely for a simple reason that the PSU is already expending so many of GBUs and HAMMERs, that their stocks are constantly critically low. Read: there are never more than around 20-30 of either in Ukraine. The West is not delivering enough for ‘more’. Sure, this can change in the future (especially if the F-16s arrived together with ALQ-131s and towed decoys), but: right now, this is simply not the case and thus, I think, there’s no point in discussing this.
Check out the blog Sarcastosaurus and Helion & Company website for books featuring interesting stories written by The Aviation Geek Club contributor Tom Cooper.
Photo credit: War Thunder, Tech. Sgt. Kevin Gruenwald / U.S. Air Force, F-16.net, and Twitter
